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BIEWEND

[Sac. No. 5405.

v.

BIEWEND.

[17 C. (2d)

In Bank.-January 28, 1941.]

LOTTIE C. BIEWE;ND, Respondent, v. ADOLPH C. BIEWEND, Appellant.
[1] Divorce and Separation - Foreign Divorces - Judgment for
Alimony-Accrued InstaIIments.-An order for the payment
of money as alimony rendered by a court cif competent jurisdiction in one state must be recognized by all other states under the full faith and credit clause as to all accrued installments not subject to modification by the court rendering the
original order. Only if such accrued payments are still subject to modification may recovery be denied.
[2] Judgments-Sister State, etc., Judgments-Sister State Judgments-Full Faith and Credit-Judgment on Cause of Action
Against Public PolicY.-A valid judgment must be accorded
full faith and credit by every other court in the United States
even though the cause of action upon which the judgment was
based is against the law and public policy of the state in
which enforcement is sought.
[3] Divorce and Separation - Foreign Divorces - Judgment for
Alimony-Accrued Installments-Effect of Subsequent Events.
A judgment of another state for alimony must be accorded~
full faith and credit as to accrued alimony notwithstanding
the subsequent marriage of the wife to another, her later resumption of marital relations with the defendant, and the
coming of age of the children of the marriage, where these
facts do not, under the law of the state where the judgment
was rendered, release the defendant from the obligation to pay
alimony. And this is true despite the fact that the California
rule may be otherwise.
[4] ld.-Foreign Divorces-Judgments for Alimony-Future Payments.-The full faith and credit clause does not obligate
the courts of one state to enforce an alimony decree rendered
in another state with regard to future payments, particularly
when such future installments are subject to modification by
the court of original jurisdiction. Such enforcement may,
however, be given on the basis of comity.
[5] ld.-Foreign Divorces - Judgment for Alimony-Establishment as Decree of California Court-Limitation on Rule.-The
5. See 5 Cal. Jur. 422; 11 Am. Jur. 300.
McK. Dig. References: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6. Divorce and Separation,
§ 305; 2. Judgments, § 474; 7, 8. Limitation of Actions, § 16;
9. Limitation of Actions, § 143; 10. Appeal and Error, § 1158.
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rule of comity by which a sister state judgment for future
payments of alimony may be established as a decree of a
California Court is subject to the principle that foreign laws
will not be given effect contrary to the settled public policy
of the forum. But to bring a case within the limitation of the
rule it must be clear that the enforcement of the right obtained under the laws of another state would be prejudicial
to recognized standards of morality and to the general interest of the citizens in the state of the forum. A mere
variance
forcement.between these laws does not warrant denial of enId. - Foreign DivorceS-Judgment for AlimonY-Establish_
ment as Decree of California Court-Effect of Marriage and
Coming of Age of Children.-A sister state judgment for
future payments of alimony may be established as a decree
of a California Court under the rule of comity, notwithstand_
ing the Subsequent remarriage of the parties, and the coming
of age of the children, where under the law of the state in
which the judgment was rendered, tIle obligation of the defendant is not released thereby. The California court judgment ordering such payment is enforceable until such time as
the original decree is modified.
Limitation of Actions-Limitation Laws and Agreements_
ApplicabilitY-Law Governing.-The barring of a claim, including a judgment, by the statute of limitations is a procedural matter governed by the law of the forum, regardless
of where the cause of action arose.
[8] Id.-Limitation Laws and Agreements _ ApplicabilitY_Law
Governing-Application of Statutes.-Code of Civil Procedure,
section 361, declaring that an action shall not be maintained
against a perSOn upon a cause of action which arose in another state upon which by the laws thereof an action cannot
be maintained against him by reason of the lapse of time,
except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state
and who held the cause of action from the time it accrued,
applies only to causes of action barred by the law of the state
of creation, but not by the law of this state.
(9] Id.-Procedure-Pleading-Answer_Pleading by Reference to
Code Sections.-In an action on a foreign judgment for alimony, brought after the running of the limitations statute
of the state of its rendition by a plaintiff who had not
been a citizen of this state from the time the cause of action
accrued, the defendant properly pleaded the statute of limitations when he aUeged in his answer that the plaintiff's cause
of action "is barred by the provision of section 361 of the

8. See 5 Cal. Jur. 433 i II Am. Jur. 50S.
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Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California." (See
Code Civ. Proc., sec. 458.)
[10] Appeal and Error - Review-Presumptions-Sufficiency of
Evidence-Applications of Rule-Defenses-Bar of Statute of
Limitations.-On an appeal on a judgment roll alone, it will
be presumed, that a finding that a sister state judgment for
alimony was not barred by Code of Civil Procedure, section
361, was supported by the evidence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County. C. W. Miller, Judge. Affirmed.
Gumpert &·Mazzera and C. H. Hogan for Appellant.
Nathan H. Snyder, Lawrence Edwards and Chas. H. Epperson for' RespondE)nt.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff secured a decree of divorce in
Missouri on May 10, 1918, which provided that defendant
pay her $25 per week for the support of herself and their
four minor children. Both parties were before the court
and subject to its jurisdiction. Subsequently they came to
California., Between the date of the original divorce decree
in Missouri and the time of bringing this action all the
minor children reached their majority. Meanwhile plaintiff .:.!
married and divorced a second time after which she again
lived with defendant for a period of four years. In 1938,
the plaintiff brought suit upon the decree in the Superior
Court of San Joaquin County, and recovered a judgment
ordering not only the payment of those installments which
had accrued within five years prior to the beginning of the
action but also payment to her of $25 per week from the
date of the judgment. Defendant has appealed from this
judgment.
[1] An order for the payment of money as alimony rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one state must
be recognized by aU other states under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution as to all accrued installments not subject to modification by the court
rendering the original order. (Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1
[30 Sup. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905] ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S.
183 [21 Sup. (;t: 555, 45 L. Ed. 810]; Barber v. Barber,
62 U. S. (21 How.) 582 [16 L. Ea. ~36~ ; Goodrich, Conflict
10. See 12 Cal. Jur. 877; 16 Cal. Jur. 626; 3 Am. Jur. 506; 1::
R. C. L. 1004.
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of Laws [2d ed.], sec. 135; A. L. I. Restatement, Conflicts of
Laws, sec. 464; Barns v. Barns, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 427 [50 Pac.
(2d) 463]; Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48 [59 Pac. (2d)
953, 106 A. L. R. 580] ; Thomas v. Thomas, 14 Cal. (2d) 355
[94 Pac. (2d) 810]; Spalding v. Spalding, 75 Cal. App. 569
[243 Pac. 445] ; Rinkenberger v. Rinkenberger, 99 Cal. App.
45 [277 Pac. 1096]; Mercantile Acceptance 00. v. Frank,
203 Cal. 483 [265 Pac. 190, 57 A. L. R. 696] ; Palen v. Palen,
12 Cal. App. (2d) 357 [55 Pac. (2d) 228]; Oreager v. Superior Oourt, 126 Cal. App. 280 [14 Pac. (2d) 552] ; Dreesen
v. Dreesen, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 479 [88 Pac. (2d) 223] ; Handschy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac. (2d)
123] ; Oummings v. Oummings, 97 Cal. App. 144 [275 Pac.
245] ; Morrow v. Morrow, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 474 [105 Pac.
(2d) 129].)
Only if such accrued payments are still subject to modification may recovery be denied. (Bentley v. Oalabrese, 155
Misc. 843 [280 N. Y. Supp. 454]; Weston v. Weston, 177
La. 305 [148 So. 241] ; Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85 [75 N. E.
92; 4 Ann. Cas. 296] ; Bleuer v. Bleuer, 27 Oklo 25 [110 Pac.
736] ; Levine v. Levine, 95 Or. 94 [187 Pac. 609]; Hunt V.
Monroe, 32 Utah, 428 [91 Pac. 269, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 249] ;
Henry V. Henry, 74 W. Va. 563 [82 S. E. 522, L. R. A.
1916D, 1024].)
Under the law of Missouri courts of that state will make
no modification of the right to accrued installments. The
wife thus has a vested right to them enforceable in other
states on the basis of full faith and credit. (Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412 [221 S. W. 1066].) Neither the subsequent
marriage of the divorced wife to another nor her subsequent
resumption of marital relations with the defendant nor the
coming of age of the children automatically releases the defendant from his obligations to pay alimony. They merely
afford grounds for the court in its discretion to modify or
vacate the order as to future installments upon proper application. (Niedt v. Niedt, (Mo. App.) 95 S. W. (2d) 868.)
Section 1355 of Revised Missouri Statutes [1929], volume I,
page 567, provides that the court may modify the order for
payment of alimony but only Upon application of either of
the parties.

[2] It is well settled that once a valid judgment has been
rendered it must be accorded full faith and credit by every
other court within the United States even though the cause
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of action upon which the judgment was based is against the
law and public policy of the state in which enforcement is
sought. (Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 [28 Sup. Ct.
641, 52 L. Ed. 1039]; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449
[48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed. 365]; Milwaukee County v.
M. E. White Company, 296 U. S. 268 [56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80
L. Ed. 220]; Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago,
280 Fed. 525 [51 App. D. C. 394]; Westwater v. Murray,
245 Fed. 427 [157 C. C. A. 589] ; Morrow v. Morrow, supraj
24 A. L. R. 1437 j Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [2d ed.], sec.
207.) [3] In the present case the provision of the California law that a divorced wife is no longer entitled to alimony
after she has remarried (Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 139 j Cohen
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99 [88 Pac. 267, 11 Ann. Cas. 520] j
Tremper v. Tremper, 39 Cal. App. 62 [177 Pac. 868] j Atlass
v. Atlass, 112 Cal. App. 514 [297 Pac. 53] j McClure v. McClure,4 Cal. (2d) 356 [49 Pac. (2d) 584, 100 A. L. R. 12571 j
Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 661 [45 Pac. (2d) 246]) or
the 'rule that a court may reduce alimony payments upon the
coming of age of the minor children (Hale v. Hale, supra)
can in no way diminish the obligation of the California
court to give full faith and credit to the Missouri decree with
regard to accrued installments of alimony.
.}
[4] The full faith and credit clause, however, does not
obligate the courts of one state to enforce an alimony
decree rendered in another state with regard to future payments, particularly when such future installments are subject to modification by the court of original jurisdiction.
(Sistare v. Sistare, supraj Lynde v. Lynde, supraj Barber
v. Barber, supraj Cummings v. Cwmmings, 97 Cal. App. 144
[275 Pac. 245] ; Creager v. Superior Court, supraj Rinkenberger v. Rinkenberger, supraj Barns v. Barns, supraj McCullough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288 [168 N. W. 929] j Levy
v. Dockendorff, 177 App. Div. 249 [163 N. Y. Supp. 435];
Richardsv. Richards, 87 Misc. 134 [149 N. Y. Supp. 1028] ;
Ca'mpbell v. Campbell, 28 Okl. 838 [115 Pac. 11111; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 117 Ohio, 558 [160 N. E. 34, 57 A. L. R.
11081; Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49 [135 Atl. 840] ;
McWilliams v. McWilliams, 216 Ala. 16 [112 So. 318] ; Freund
v. Freund, 71 N. J. Eq. 524 [63 Atl. 756] ; Reik v. Reik, 101
N. J. Eq. 523 [139 Atl. 385] ; A. L. 1., Rest. Conflicts of Laws,
sec. 464.) In the present case the Missouri court clearly retains authority to modify the amount of future installments
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not yet due upon proper application showing good cause by
the defendant (Sec. 1355, Revised Missouri Statutes [1929],
vol. I, p. 567; Niedt v. Niedt, (Mo. App.) 104 S. w. (2d)
692; Meyers v. ],!eyers, 91 Mo. App. 151.)
Upon the basis of comity, however, as distinguished from
the requirements of full faith and credit, the California courts
have in numerous cases ordered that a foreign decree for
future payments of alimony be established as the decree of
the California court with the same force and effect as if
it had been entered in this state, including punishment for
contempt if the defendant fails to comply. (Palen v; Palen,
12 Cal. App. (2d) 357 [55 Pac. (2d) 228]; Creager v. Superior Court, supraj Straus v. Straus, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 461
[41 Pac. (2d) 218, 42 Pac. (2d) 378]; Cummings v. Cummings, Supraj Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48 [59 Pac. (2d)
953, 106 A. L. R. 580] ; see, also, Morrow v. Morrow, supra.)
[5] Such a rule of comity is subject to the principle that
foreign laws will not be given effect when contrary to the
settled public policy of the forum. (Estate of Lathrop, 165
Cal. 243 [131 Pac. 752]; Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192
[38 Pac. 636]; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532 [31 Pac. 915,
19 L. R. A. 40] ; Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120; Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [24 L. Ed. 565] ; Green v. Van Buskirk,
72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 307 [18 L. Ed. 599] ; Smith v. Union Bank,
30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 518 [8 L. Ed. 212] ; 5 Cal. Jur. 422; 12
C. J. 439.) It must be clear, however, that the enforcement
of the right obtained under the laws of another state would
be prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to
the general interests of the citizens in the state of the forum.
(Dennick v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J., 103 U. S. 11 [26
L. Ed. 439]; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31
Minn. 11 [16 N. W. 413,47 Am. Rep. 771] ; Powell v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 102 Minn. 448 [113 N. W. 1017] ; Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99 [120 N. E. 198] ;
Internationa,l Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114 [124
N. W. 1042, 20 Ann. Cat3. 614, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 774];
Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192 [38 Pac. 636]; 5 Cal. Jur.
423; 12 C. J. 439.) Actually as set forth in the Restatement: "There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of duties validly created by the law governing
their creation. Denial of enforcement of the foreign claim
will result in an undeserved benefit to the defendant."
(A. L. I. Rest. of Conflicts of Laws, sec. 612, comment c; see

"
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Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights
[1918],27 Yale L. J. 656.) A mere variance between the law
of the forum and the law of the state where the cause arose
does not alone warrant such denial of enforcement. (Dennick v. Oentral R. R.Oo. of N. J., supra; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. 00., supra; Powell v. Great Northern
Ry. 00., supra; Loucks v. Standard Oil 00. of N. Y., supra;
International Harvester 00. v. McAdam, supra; Whitney
v. Dodge, supra; 5 Cal. Jur. 423; 12 C. J. 439.)
[6] In the present case the Missouri law differs from that
of California in permitting alimony payments to continue
after the remarriage of the divorced wife. (Gunderson v.
Gunderson, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 257 [40 Pac. (2d) 956].)
Such a right to receive future installments of alimony, however, even though at variance with Civil Code, section 139,
is not perforce inharmonious with local public policy. It
offers no threat to either the moral standards or the general
interests of the citizens of this state. To hold that the right
created in Missouri is so immoral as to be unenforceable
here would involve a complacent attribution of moral superiority to this state. The remarriage and the coming of
age of the minor children offer grounds for modification of
the original decree for which the defendant can make appli- ~
cation in the court of original jurisdiction in Missouri, and
it is not incumbent upon the California court to refuse to
give prospective effect to the decree upon these grounds.
(Handschy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac.
(2d) 123].) Therefore, the judgment of the trial court
ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $25 per week
in the future from the date of the judgment is valid and
enforceable· until such ti~e as the Missouri court modifies
its decre!'!.
[7] It is a principle of conflict of laws recognized in
California that the barring of a claim by the statute of limitations is a procedural matter governed by the law of the
forum, regardless of where the cause of action arose. (MeElmoyle v. Oohen, 38 U. S. [13 Pet.] 312 [10 L. Ed. 177] ;
Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U. S. [9 How.] 407 [13 L. Ed.
194] ; Royal Trust 00. v. MacBean, 168 Cal. 642 [144 Pac.
139] ; Miller v. Lane, 160 Cal. 90 [116 Pac. 58].) It is a
corollary that an action brought upon a judgment of a sister
state is subject to the limitations prescribed by thE! law of

"j
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the state where the action is brought. (Stewart v. Spaulding,
72 Cal. 264 [13 Pac. 661] ; 3 Freeman, Judgments, sec. 1456.)
Section 336 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides that an action upon a judgment or decree of any
court of the United States or of any state within the United
States must be brought within five years. A decree for future payments of alimony is a continuing judgment. The
trial court in this case therefore gave judgment for those installments of alimony which had accrued within five years
prior to the bringing of the action, the California statute
of limitations having run on all installments accruing prior
to that time.
[8] Section 361 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
however, provides: "When a cause of action has arisen in
another state, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof
an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall
not be maintained against him in this state, ex·cept in favor
of one who has been a citizen of this state, and who held
the cause of action from the time it accrued." This section
applies only to causes of action barred by the law of the
state of creation, but not by the law of this state. (Littlepage v. Morek, 120 Cal. App. 88 [7 Pac. (2d) 716].) Since
the plaintiff has not been a citizen of this state from the
time the cause of action accrued, this section has the effect
of applying the Missouri statute of limitations to those installments accruing within five years, upon which the California statute of limitations has not run. (Stewart v. Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264 [13 Pac. 661] ; Van Buskirk v. Kuhns, 164
Cal. 472 [129 Pac. 587, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 932, 44 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 710].)
Defendant therefore sets up as a bar to this action section 886 of the Revised Missouri Statutes of 1929, in force
at the time the original alimony decree was secured by plaintiff, which provides: "Every judgment, order or decree of
any court of record of the United States, or of this Or any
other state, territory or county, shall be presumed to be
paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from
the date of the original rendition thereof, or if the same has
been revived upon personal service duly had upon the defendant or defendants therein, then after ten years from
and after such revival, or in case a payment has been made
on such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon
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the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from
the last payment so made, and after the expiration of ten
years from the date of the original rendition or revival upon
personal service, or from the date of the last payment, such
judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no
execution, order or process issued thereon, nor shall any
suit be brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose
whatever. "
This section has been held effective to cut off the right
to continuing alimony installments if no payment is made
or action' taken upon the original decree within ten years
after rendition. (Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401 [116 S. W.
(2d) 1].) It has been interpreted, however, by the Missouri
courts as constituting a statute of limitations which must
be specially pleaded to be available in defense to an action
on a judgment. (Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Smith,
(Mo. App.) 17 S. W. (2d) 378; Flink v. Parcell, 344 Mo.
49 [124 S. W. (2d) 1189].)
[9] Defendant properly pleaded his contention under
California law when he alleged by answer that plaintiff's
cause of action "is barred by the provisions of Section 361
of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California."
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 458; Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann,
157 Cal. 192, 193, 198 [106 Pac. 715, 21 Ann. Cas. 1279].)
The trial court, however, eX'Pressly found that" it is not true
that .said judgment is barred by Section 361 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of the State of California." [10] Defendant 'has appealed upon the judgment roll alone. He has
made no showing on appeal that any evidence was introduced
below to sustain his burden of proving that the cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations. (Code Civ.
Proc., sec. 458; First National Bank v. Armstrong, 110 Cal.
App. 408 [294 Pac. 25]; 16 Cal. Jur. 626.) He has not
shown that plaintiff failed to take some action upon the
original decree within ten years after its rendition. Every
intendment favors the validity of the judgment as rendered,
and if no evidence is presented in the record on appeal,
it must be assumed that sufficient evidence was presented
to the trial court to sustain its finding of fact. (Morris v.
Board of Education, 119 Cal. App. 750 [7 Pac. (2d) 364,
8 Pac. (2d) 502]; Archer v. Harvey, 164 Cal. 274 [128 Pac.
410].) Defendant's contention that the action is barred by

"
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section 361 of the Code of Civil Procedure therefore cannot
be sustained.
The jUdgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Peters, J., pro tem., Ward, J.,
pro tem., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.

~

CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
I concur' in that portion of the majority opmIOn which
holds that the judgment should be affirmed as to those alimony payments which had accrued under the Missouri decree within five years immediately preceding the commencement of this action, but I dissent from that portion of said
opinion which purports to affirm that portion of the judgment of the trial court establishing the Missouri decree as a
California judgment requiring payments henceforth of $25
per week by the husband to the wife although the Missouri
award was for the support of both the children and the wife,
and the children have now reached majority, and the wife,
since the Missouri decree, has remarried. It is true that the
second marriage has been dissolved, but when we consider
that the wife has done nothing to enforce the Missouri decree
.from the time of its entry until 1938, and during that time
has lived with the husband for four years and has been
married and divo:~ced a second time, considerations of good
morals, social principles, natural justice, and fair play require a determination that it is against the public policy
of this state to establish the Missouri decree as a California
judgment requiring the husband in the future to pay $25
per week to the wife. It must be conceded that whether or
not future payments under the Missouri decree shall be
so established, lies entirely in the discretion of the trial court,
unaffected by the full faith and credit clause of the federal
Constitution; but it is contended that such establishment is
not against the public policy of this state as expressed by
the legislature in section 139 of the Civil Code, which provides that alimony payments shall cease upon remarriage
of the wife. The term "public policy" as used in connection
with the enforcement by one state of another state's laws
is at best vague and impossible of precise definition, and it
is true that a state's public policy ordinarily is not violated
merely because there is a variance in the laws of the states
involved, and that before there is such a violation of the law

118

BIEWEND

v.

BIEWEND.

of the other state, it must be contrary to good morals or
natural justice. But in this instance we have a declaration
of policy in California which states that a woman cannot
look to her former divorced husband for support and maintenance after she has become the wife of another man. It
is undoubtedly a fundamental social principle inherent in
the fiber of any flourishing and successful social order, that
marriage, and the home life and families that flow therefrom, are to be fostered and encouraged at all times. The
law that relieves a man from further alimony payments after
his divorced wife remarries, not only encourages a man to
remarry and establish a home and rear a family because he
is relieved of the burden of supporting his first wife, but
in the majority of instances will make his remarriage a
possibility j whereas, due to economic circumstances, it would
be out of the question~ if he has a former wife to support.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that natural justice and
fundamental social principles are advanced and secured by
the policy declared in section 139 of our Civil Code and any
law to the contrary is a violation of the public policy involved in the doctrine of comity and should not be countenanced by this court. There is no injustice caused to the .
woman. When she marries the second time, she takes her --'
new companion for better or worse, and chooses, and in
justice should look to him and him alone for her maintenance.
He should not be relieved from this obligation, nor be permitted to live a life of ease and idleness at the expense of
not only the efforts and toil of the first husband, but also at
the much greater cost of making it economically impossible
for the first husband to remarry. The decision cites Handschy v. Handsclvy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac. (2d) 123],
for its position, but rather than supporting it, that decision
unequivocally states that, it is against the public policy of
California to enforce a divorce decree of a sister state which
requires the payment of alimony after remarriage. In the
cited case it is said at page 509: "Appellant contends also
that as the children are of age the amount of alimony
awarded was ipso facto reduced to the extent that the same
provided for their maintenance, support, and that the trial
court erred in refusing to allow him credit accordingly, although no modification had been made of the decree of the
illinois court. No authority is cited by appellant in support of
his contention, nor have we found any. There are cases where
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accrued installments of an nward for support and maintenance for wife and minor children were cancelled, the wife
having remarried and the children become of age, but in
those cases it is clear that the remarriage of the wife was
the principal factor considered by the court, it being held
that to require a husband to pay for the support and maintenance of his divorced wife, following her remarriage to
another, would in the absence of extraordinary conditions,
violate a sound principle of law and be against recognized
public policy. (Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 661 r45
Pac. (2d) 246] j Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal. App. 514 [297
Pac. 53].)"
Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do
violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice
and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the
Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to
the wife in the future. The portion of the judgment of the
trial court so declaring should be reversed.

[L. A. No. 17588. In Bank.-January 29, 1941.]
;. ~
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JOHN E. STALEY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA et aI., Respondents.
[1] Attorneys at Law-Right to Practice and Admission to BarProcedure for Admission-Review of Examination-Petition.
A petition in a mandamus proceeding by an unsuccessful applicant for admission to the bar is insufficient where it makes
no charge of fraud, imposition or coercion, and does not assert
a denial of a fair opportunity to take the examination, but
amounts to nothing more than a statement of petitioner's
general qualifications, and a statement that his answers entitle him to a passing grade notwithstanding the grade given
his papers by the Committee of Bar Examiners. The peti.
tioner must show wherein the determination of the board was
incorrect or unfair. And the court will not assume from
the statement of petitioner's qualifications that it was im~
possible for him to receive the grades given by the committee.

1. See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 362.
McK. Dig. References: L Attorneys at Law, § 19.

